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5 **Abstract**

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7 *Index terms—*

8 **1 I. INTRODUCTION**

9 In recent decades, the acceleration of networks and international flows of goods, people and ideas, has expanded
10 the discussion on the role of National States in the future in a context of intensified sharing of products, wealth
11 and global problems.

12 A more attentive reading of the current geopolitical framework, where materiality and immateriality ideologies
13 and economies are amalgamated, aim to a future where the increasing density in the use of territory will lead to
14 intersections of interests in the context of disputes between nations and business corporations.

15 Obviously, diplomacy can and must work so that peaceful solutions are found and thus any clash of interests is
16 seen as something that can be resolved. However, it is possible to observe that certain strategies of some national
17 states are totally immersed in geopolitical conditions that treat the aspirations of countries as imperative issues for
18 national survival. When disagreements between nations reach this level, diplomacy loses much of its negotiation
19 capacity.

20 Projects for inter-oceanic and inter-maritime channels, gas pipelines, oil and mineral pipelines, highways and
21 railroads, new maritime routes that were little used before, submarine cables, airports and info-roads create nodal
22 points that involve the interests of large corporations and national states that, in addition to the environment
23 for negotiations and multilateral organizations press to exert influence in large portions of the geographic space.

24 Understanding the foreign policies of Russia and Turkey is one of the most important and challenging tasks
25 of current geopolitics.

26 **2 II. RUSSIAN AND TURKISH EURASIANISMS IN THE
27 CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL POLITICAL IDENTI-
28 TIES**

29 countries, so-called socialist countries linked to the Soviet Union, to a market economy. This reignited discussions
30 about the possibility of expanding capitalist relations of production. This perspective includes all of Eastern
31 Europe and the gigantic territorial mass represented by the Eurasian dimension of Russia and the former Soviet
32 republics.

33 They were literally new frontiers for diplomacy and the world economy. In many of these countries, the
34 considerable reserves of raw materials attracted investors and attracted investors and new business conglomerates
35 were born, which are also fundamental for understanding the current geopolitical situation.

36 For this new reality, it was possible to notice the gradual resumption of discussions on the theses of Halford
37 ??ackinder (1861 ??ackinder (-1947)), British professor at the London School of Economics who defended in
38 1904, at a conference at the Royal Geographical Society, the ideas that became the important article entitled
39 "The Geographical Pivot History". He supported the view that the existence of the Heartland or Earth-Heart,
40 which would correspond to the centre of Russia and surroundings, once dominated would allow the control of a
41 considerable part of the terrestrial globe. This is how Russia and its surroundings reassumed its position as a
42 global geostrategic pivot.

43 Due to its hegemonic role, it was in the United States of America that this theme attracted a lot of centrality
44 with an enormous intellectual production on the subject. This new Russian Eurasianism began to coexist with

4 III. AREAS OF INFLUENCE, DIPLOMACY AND GEOPOLITICS: PRAGMATISMS THAT DO NOT ERASE NATIONALISMS

45 a novelty in the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey that adapted to the new geopolitical conditions of the
46 New World Order anchored in the contradictions and dualities of the country. Secular but with growing influence
47 from Islam, a NATO member with regional power aspirations, an Asian with European ties and pretensions.

48 In 1985 the English researcher and journalist David Barchard coined the term "neo-Ottomanism" in an article
49 entitled "Turkey and West" published by the Royal Institute International Affairs -Chatam House. He tried to
50 show the extent of Turkish interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus since the 1974 invasion, when the Turkish
51 army took over the northern part of the island, which became the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

52 The use of the term Neo-Ottomanism generates academic debates inside and outside Turkey. Prof. Karabekir
53 Akkoyunlu researcher at the Center for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz, Austria says in
54 his article "The defeat of the 'real' neo-Ottomanists":

55 3 In fact, the neo-Ottomanism of President Recep Tayyip 56 Erdo?an and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not 57 only intellectually unrelated, but also diametrically opposed 58 to the principles of the original Ottomanists, the nineteenth 59 and early twentieth century proponents of pluralism, consti- 60 tutionalism and parliamentarism in the Ottoman Empire".

61 The Armenian Genocide in 1915 is proof that it really wasn't like that. Calling neo-Ottomanism the current
62 Turkish geopolitical pretensions is certainly an exaggeration that is based solely and exclusively on the dimensions
63 of the ancient Sublime Porta ??1). The Erdogan Era (2002) is definitely marked by the religious conservatism
64 that permeated Kemalist nationalism (2).

65 4 III. AREAS OF INFLUENCE, DIPLOMACY AND 66 GEOPOLITICS: PRAGMATISMS THAT DO NOT ERASE 67 NATIONALISMS

68 One of the first actions that allows us to understand the importance of diplomacy for the new geopolitics that
69 was under construction in the post-Cold War era was the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States
70 -CIS in 1991. It was a political effort to maintain commercial relations between the former Soviet republics now
71 sovereign, which still had very interdependent production chains.

72 The ambitions of this community to transform itself into a broad and powerful common market have been
73 emptied over time. Its first constituent documents were still undergoing adjustments when the UN had already
74 granted the status of a regional organization with the right to participate in the 1994 General Assembly. After
75 that, the provisional text of the CEI became generic and with reservations in many subjects.

76 It is interesting to note that in the final text of the CIS statute signed in 1993 is one of the initial marks of
77 Russia's problems with Ukraine. The ukrainian President, in that time, Leonid Kravchuk (1934-2022) did not
78 sign the document, claiming that he was affronting his country's internal legislation and that he would remain a
79 collaborator of the bloc. Even if initially, this was already a demonstration of Ukrainian nationalist bias.

80 In that same period, a new character came to figure in this equation. Turkey, a NATO member country,
81 governed at the time by Turgut Ozal ??1989) ??1990) ??1991) ??1992) ??1993), attentive to the geostrategic
82 issues of the Black Sea, was one of the first countries to recognize the constitution and the new Ukrainian
83 government, as well as its territorial integrity. Over the years Turkish-Ukrainian relations have deepened.
84 Bilateral trade and technological exchange grew. Just remember that the Turkish government provided the
85 powerful Bayraktar TB2 drones to the Ukrainian armed forces in the war against Russia and this was done after
86 having provided them to be tested by Azerbaijan against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 (3).

87 In addition, Turkish foreign policy played a leading role in multilateral arrangements of global scope during
88 the government of Necmettin Erbakan ??1996) ??1997) One of the main vectors of this power were the large
89 companies and conglomerates from the most diverse sectors. Builders, weaving, food industries, transport,
90 telecommunications, all expanding their businesses in a framework that allowed the resumption of the term
91 neo-Ottomanism.

92 In the case of Russia, the conjunctures of the 1990s also played a decisive role. Moscow understood that
93 the diplomatic or geopolitical projection must obligatorily go beyond the CIS agreements. The new Russian
94 leaderships and the emerging oligarchies needed to guarantee their influence in the so-called "near abroad".
95 Between 1992 and 1993, the documents that gave rise to the Collective Security Treaty Organization were signed,
96 the first arrangement of a military alliance between the former Soviet republics.

97 Following This further pushed Azerbaijan towards a formal military alliance with Turkey, which was the first
98 country to recognize post-Soviet Azerbaijan in 1991, asserting the Turkish ethnic identity that unites the two
99 countries. In 2000, that is, shortly after Azerbaijan withdrew from the OTSC, the Training and Education

100 Center of Armed Forces was created, a military school where the Turkish Armed Forces command began to
101 provide training for Azerbaijani military personnel, including NATO protocols.

102 Certainly, Turkey's approachment to Azerbaijan and Ukraine generated Russian distrust in the diplomatic field.
103 The most important economic and trade issues deserved a different treatment between Moscow and Ankara. In
104 1999, for example, the mega project of the Blue Stream gas pipeline was signed. With an approximate cost of
105 US\$ 4 billion, it started operating in 2003 bringing natural gas from Russia, via the Black Sea, to be distributed
106 through Turkish territory, especially to Europe. This is not a simple work. It is a partnership between the
107 powerful Russian company Gazprom and the Turkish company Botas Petroleum.

108 From a geopolitical point of view, the Russian government understood that its problems with Ukrainians and
109 Turkish were added to the advance of NATO, which was expanding strategic partnerships in its former area
110 of influence in Eastern Europe. Strategically, it was important to ease possible pressures coming from other
111 regions London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences and borders to concentrate war power on
112 a European front in the event of an eventuality. This thesis proved adequate to the crisis with Ukraine that led
113 to the retaking of Crimea by the Russians in 2014.

114 In 1996, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan committed themselves at a summit meeting in
115 Shanghai to reduce troops at the borders and expand mechanisms of mutual trust in the area of security. The
116 success of this agreement brought Russia and China even closer together, which in 2001 led the formalization
117 of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. With the rapid adherence of Uzbekistan, the organization began to
118 expand collaboration from energy sources to the modernization of transport and telecommunications. Later, with
119 the accession of India and Pakistan, the gradual construction of a new order in International Relations became
120 more and more explicit, since the members of the Shanghai Summit represented the largest population and the
121 largest area of the globe.

122 The high point of this process was when, in the same period in 2001, Russia and China signed the Treaty of
123 Cooperation and Good Neighborhood, expanding mutual trust and enabling the execution of large contracts for
124 the supply and management of energy resources between the two countries.

125 The multifaceted quest to expand partnerships and influence through multilateral agreements has become the
126 world's keynote. Because they have contiguous zones of influence and theoretically are on opposite sides (Turkey
127 has been a member of NATO since 1952), this new diplomatic cartography of Russia and Turkey came to have
128 a different weight in international relations.

129 From 2003 onwards, in Erdogan Era, in Turkey, the motto "One nation, two states" gained strength to refer to
130 links with Azerbaijan. For Ankara, Azerbaijan is a political and territorial spearhead in its intentions to restore
131 ties with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, with which it has historical and cultural ties. Diplomatic
132 efforts and multilateral talks that began in the 1990s allowed Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to sow
133 the seed in 2006 for what in 2009 would become the Cooperation Council of Turkish-Speaking States, today
134 the Organization of Turkish States. This institution has an agenda ranging from collaboration in the field of
135 technology to discussions on foreign policy. The most recent advance is the project for customs facilitation
136 corridor between the member countries launched in 2022. With a strong presence of Turkish companies, business
137 between Turkey and these countries is already approaching the figure of US\$ 20 billion annually. Further more,
138 members admitted the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an observer to the organization last year, which
139 is sure to create embarrassment with Greece and the Greekmajority Cypriot government.

140 The Erdogan-Aliyev partnership has gained even more importance with the current scenario of heightened
141 tensions in the West with Russia, Iran and China. Turkey is undoubtedly Azerbaijan's biggest ally. It is an
142 important "landlocked country"(5) that has skillfully managed its availability of energy resources, especially
143 oil and natural gas, in international trade. From the Shah Deniz gas fields in the Azerbaijani Caspian to the
144 Erzurum terminal or the Port of Yumurtalik, both in Turkey, a strong partnership has developed between British
145 Petroleum, SOCAR (State Oil Company Azerbaijan Republic) and the Turkish state TPAO, all shareholders of
146 extensive gas and oil pipelines that span the entire region.

147 In that period of favorable economic conjunctures, pragmatism in the commercial field, between Russia and
148 Turkey, was present once again in 2010. That year, the agreement was reached which made possible the start
149 of construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Complex in southwest Turkey, on the shores of the Mediterranean. The
150 project and a good part of the initial investments are in charge of the Russian company Rosatom. Construction
151 was carried out by the Turkish mega-construction company Ozdogu, which also operates in the mineral sector.
152 There will be 4 power generation plants and the project will cost between US\$ 20 and 30 billion. The civil war
153 that destroyed part of Syrian territory was fueled by the support of foreign intelligence agencies, including the
154 Turkish one, which were trying to get rid of yet another anti-Western leader, in this case, Bashar -Al -Assad.
155 As for the Russians, Syria is a historical ally that allowed, in 1971, the leasing of the Port of Tartus on its
156 Mediterranean coast as a support base for the Russian naval fleet.

157 After 20 years without strategic-military use, the Port of Tartus region has returned to activity. It was from
158 there that Russia launched the first attacks against jihadist positions in Syria in 2013.

159 It is important to remember that the Turkish government used the conflict in Syria to try to violently repress
160 the Kurdish people in their libertarian, democratic and feminist struggle in Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan. In 2017
161 Russia and Syria renewed and expanded the possibilities of using Tartus with projects to expand the berths and
162 facilities.

5 IV. THE RECENT EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND TURKEY AS A POSSIBLE TRUER OF THE GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE

163 Between comings and goings Putin and Erdogan met pragmatically once again in 2014. During a visit by Putin
164 to Turkey, the signing of an agreement between the oil companies of both countries was announced. GAZPROM
165 and BOTAS undertook to create the TurkStream, a mega gas pipeline that would connect Krasnodar in Russia
166 to Kiyikoy in Turkey and from there to all of Southeast Europe. The execution of the project was suspended
167 when, in 2015, in the midst of the conflict in Syria, Turkish air defense shot down a Russian Sukhoi military plane,
168 generating a serious diplomatic crisis. It was only with the reconciliation in 2016 that the works really took off.

169 5 IV. THE RECENT EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND TURKEY AS A POSSIBLE TRUER OF THE 170 GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE

172 In 2017 Ankara made one of its highest bets in the geopolitical field. The Turkish government purchased S-400
173 anti-missile systems from Russia despite being a member of NATO.

174 Retaliation by the United States was not long in coming. Turkey was formally accused of breaking the
175 military alliance pact and for this reason it was suspended from the development program of the ultra-modern
176 F-35 Strike Fighter fighters. This will prevent the country from continuing to participate in the construction of
177 these warplanes and will obviously not receive them when they are ready.

178 In 2022, Turkey claimed problems maintaining the anti-missile purchase agreement with the Russians due to
179 bureaucratic issues involving its participation in the technological development and production of equipment.
180 This once again opened channels of dialogue with Washington even if momentarily as the dynamics of Turkish
181 and Russian foreign policies could and can change rapidly.

182 For Russia, the international situation was extremely unfavorable in 2018. The growing tensions and conflicts
183 with Ukraine and the totally adverse international scenario with blockades and sanctions led to a new Russian
184 diplomatic and economic offensive.

185 That year, the 5th Meeting of Heads of State of the Caspian Countries was held in the port of Aktau in
186 Kazakhstan. Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have finally begun to close the diplomatic
187 void that has existed over Caspian boundaries and jurisdictions since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
188 Among many resolutions, the prohibition of the military presence of any other country in those waters other than
189 those bathed by the Caspian was defined. It was a clear message from Moscow to the Azerbaijani government of
190 Ilham Aliyev to London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 52 allow warships from Turkey,
191 its biggest ally, to navigate the Caspian.

192 The Aktau agreements in 2018 ended up also generating new expectations in the area of infrastructure. Gas
193 and oil pipelines will finally be able to cross the Caspian at the bottom of its waters, linking its western and
194 eastern banks and more precisely integrating in an even more dynamic way the energy resources coming from
195 Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

196 If Russian demands that there be no alien vessels in the Caspian caused any unease in Ankara, it soon
197 dissipated. It is very likely that most of the new energy sharing and distribution projects that arise will have to
198 be integrated into the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, known as TANAP and which drains Azerbaijani gas to Europe
199 and is controlled by Turkish investments that will thus benefit.

200 It is very likely that the most recent movement of pieces on this board that brought Russian and Turkish pieces
201 closer together took place in the last week of February 2023, when the 12th Conference on the Middle East of the
202 Valdai Club was held. This is an important think tank that brings together specialists from the strategic area
203 of Russia and foreign guests. Obviously, the discussion environment was influenced by the Russian-Ukrainian
204 conflict.

205 One of the subjects of the conference was the project "International North-South Transport Corridor" -INSTC.
206 Conceived since 2002 by Russia, India and Iran, the intermodal transport project aims to connect the Indian
207 Ocean and the Persian Gulf, via Iran, with the Caspian Sea and then Russian territory. The goal of the mega-
208 project is to replace the traditional, long and expensive route between the Port of Saint Petersburg and Mumbai
209 via the Suez Canal. Reduce the current 17,000 km to around 8,000 km using land connections, especially rail
210 and optimizing the use of navigation in the Caspian Sea, the border between Russia and Iran. Enthusiasts even
211 say that it would save 50% in time and 30% in transportation costs.

212 As a mark of the new phase, in early May 2022, a large Russian freighter anchored in the Port of Noshahr in the
213 Iranian Caspian after decades of absence of this type of vessel in that location. Due to these new opportunities,
214 Russians and Iranians began to project the creation of a special shipyard. As it is a lake-river-sea connection,
215 the vessels that sail there need very specific technical characteristics.

216 Being an inland sea (or closed sea) the Caspian drains its ships through the Don River, through the Russian
217 southwest until reaching the Volga-Don canals, built in the Soviet era. When these ships arrive on the Volga
218 River they head directly to the Sea of Azov and from there to the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, i.e. an
219 open sea. The Putin government allocated around US\$ 1 billion to modernize and provide more security for
220 navigation on these rivers and canals. Obviously, this expands commercial possibilities for Iran, which is linked
221 to the Russian industrial park, including the war sector.

222 The ambitions of the United States of America and even NATO in maintaining effective embargoes and

223 sanctions against Russia and Iran may be compromised if these projects to boost navigability linking the Caspian
224 to the Mediterranean help Moscow and Tehran to reduce losses.

225 If you imagine that Turkey is out of the problem this time, it's necessary to understand it isn't. Ultimately,
226 any projection of power by Russia or Iran into the waters of the Black Sea that the US-led bloc finds threatening
227 will need to rely on Turkey to exert counterpressure or deterrence. It remains to be seen whether Ankara will
228 want to play that role. Perhaps this is not the geopolitical strategy chosen by the most rebellious of NATO
229 members.

230 **6 V. CONCLUSION**

231 The paths trodden by the foreign policies and geopolitical ambitions of Russia and Turkey are approaching and
overlapping in the territory since the end of the Cold War. ¹

for Economic Cooperation along with Egypt, Iran,
Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Bangladesh,
which became a group to discuss alternatives to
reduce global disparities and create various
cooperation programs.

In few years, the growth of the Turkish economy,
in ever greater contact with European and Middle
Eastern markets, brought Turkey to the
geopolitical scene with intentions of expanding its
influence. Between 2001 and 2010, Turkey tripled
its trade with Syria, quadrupled with North Africa,
quintupled with the countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (4) -United Arab Emirates,
Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
sevenfold with Egypt.

Figure 1:

Figure 2:

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Figure 3:

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6 V. CONCLUSION

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